4:Latcham F-5 (1888-1893) 1909 SG4 Araucanians SG4

incident occurred upon the march, if such were considered inauspicious. The army immediately broke up and returned to camp. All discipline was lost, too, at the moment that booty presented itself. Then it became each one for himself.

Before the arrival of the Spaniards and for some time afterwards, the army was composed entirely of infantry (*namuntu linco*); but later on considerable bodies of cavalry were maintained.

The arms consisted of bows and arrows (*pulqui*), lances (*rengi*), spears (*huaiqui*), slings (*huitrahue*), and clubs (*lonco quillquill*). The bows were small, and the arrows thin bamboos, either sharpened, or with stone heads with serrated edges, and occasionally pointed bones. Sometimes their arrows were poisoned with the juice of the *coliguaya oderifera*. This poison was carried in small stone or earthenware jars, and smeared on the arrow tips immediately before use. The Spaniards applied salt to the wound as an antidote. The lances were long bamboos, from 15 to 20 feet in length, while the spears were about half this length. Both had stone or bone heads, or else were pointed and hardened in the fire. Their clubs were formed from *luma*, an exceedingly hard and heavy wood. They were generally more than 6 feet long, and were shaped with an elbow, like a modern hockey stick. The curved end was frequently spiked with sharp flints. They were used with both hands and were a most dreaded weapon, as no armour resisted a downright blow. The curved end was also used for dragging the wounded from their horses.

According to the testimony of the chroniclers, these Indians were very clever archers, living almost entirely by their skill in the chase. They advanced to the attack in close phalanxes. In the first ranks came the lances and spears, behind them in more open order the archers and slingers. These squadrons seldom numbered more than one hundred men, and were hurled against the enemy in rapid succession, each making its attack, and retiring to give place to a new company. Thus they continually presented a fresh and untiring front.

Later on they became expert in the construction of fortifications. These were generally built on a small hill, four-square in form, and constructed of trunks of trees, planted upright in the ground. Inside this enclosure was a smaller one which formed the real redoubt, arranged in the form of a palisade, with loopholes for archery. For a considerable space outside, the ground was honeycombed with pit-falls and ditches, lightly covered with branches of rushes and turf, at the bottom of which sharpened stakes were planted.

After a victory, a great feast was celebrated. On this occasion the prisoners taken were sacrificed, and another ceremony called the *pruloncos* or head dance was performed. A bushy sapling was planted in the ground and on its branches were placed the heads hacked from the enemies during the battle, each one adorned with flowers and garlands. Round this tree the Indians danced and sang songs of victory, each one chanting his own valiant deeds, and jeering and insulting the remains of their foes.

5:Cooper E-4 (no date) 1946 SG4 Araucanians SG4

721 not, however, to extend territory. Most of our information, however, concerns warfare as carried on between the *Araucanians* and the Spaniards.

Preparation for war.—The first step toward deciding upon war was usually the sending, by a headman or group, of a messenger to headmen and groups desired as confederates. The messenger carried an arrow tied with a red string, symbolic of blood, or, if hostilities had already begun, with the finger of a slain enemy attached to the arrow. He also carried a quipu for each headman or group, to indicate the day of assembly. When all had assembled on the appointed day, a black llama was killed and the arrows and spears were dipped in or anointed with the animal's blood, while all of the headmen ate a bit of the heart of the animal as a pledge of unified purpose. The war decision was [701] made by general agreement. A leader was chosen by preference from among the existing headmen or prominent warriors. His authority was considerable but lasted only so long as war lasted. His mark of office was the toki, the name by which he himself was called. In the later 18th century, at least, the toki-ax was kept in hiding during peacetime and brought out in time of war. The fighting men before [834] going to war shaved their heads, leaving only a circle of hair, abstained from sex relations, and ate and drank sparingly for 8 days before starting out.

●725 **Tactics and weapons.**—As early as 1568, the *Araucanians* had begun to use cavalry in battle on a fairly large scale; later, they used it much more frequently. In battle formation, the infantry advanced in the center and the cavalry on the wings. The use of advance guards, sentinels at night, trenches protected with thorn branches, pitfalls and ditches with sharp stakes at the bottom, spies and fifth-column work, and log forts and palisades was common. Each warrior carried with him a small bag of parched meal which, with salt and ají, constituted his food. A common war cry was to strike the open mouth rhythmically with the palm of the hand while shouting and to repeat this four times (Moesbach, 1936, p. 126).

411 Infantry weapons were chiefly the following: Bows and arrows, spears, clubs, and slings. The spears were 20, 30, or more palms long (circa 14 to 20 feet), with fire-hardened or stone points. Spears were sometimes thrown as javelins (Frézier, 1716, p. 58; cf. "gorguz," in Ercilla, canto 25, 1910, p. 415, and Oña, canto 6, 1917, p. 225). The bow was short, according to González de Nájera (1889, p. 95, 5 palmos) with sinew string; the arrows, according to González de Nájera (ibid., pp. 95–96), about 2½ palmos long, of cane, usually with bone heads, not poisoned but lightly attached to the shaft and apt to come off in the wound, were carried in a quiver. The clubs were of two kinds, a very long two-handed elbow club of heavy wood, about 15 palmos long, according to González de Nájera (1889, p. 96); and another type of

7:Padden H-4 (no date)1957 SG4 Araucanians SG4

723 colonists, and friars could work great wonders if the Indians would but submit. When they first settled Santiago the Spaniards proved that they could provide their living with their own hands, but full barns and producing mines were impossible of realization without Indian labor.[17] Because of this, the Spaniards always hungered for peace, and, through past experience in the Indies, expected it to follow each victory over the Indians.[18] This was the great error of the Spaniards in the sixteenth century. Whenever the Indians found it advantageous to themselves to live in peace — whether because of famine or disease or military weakness — they willingly surrendered themselves to service in the encomienda, there to repair their fortunes and to watch. The Spaniards, hopeful that this was indeed the dawn of a new day, almost invariably sought immediate expansion of their mining and agricultural activities. With a quickening of economic activity, military vigilance declined to a point which invited rebellion. The Araucanians honored such invitations without fail.[19]

Spanish military strategy was also based upon the gnawing hunger for peace. From past experience the invaders knew that peace would follow the defeat and usurpation of a central authority. In the absence of a central Araucanian authority the only alternative was to instill fear by demonstration of military supremacy, and so the Spaniards constantly sought a definitive battle which, when won, would convince the Araucanians of the futility of resistance. Some civilians differed, advising an Indian policy founded upon kind treatment and remission of
● 725 personal service, but their voices were seldom heard. Recognizing the Spaniards' willingness to do battle, the Araucanians always chose their own battle sites where the terrain could be used to advantage, where the horse, as a military instrument, could be rendered less effective, and where their own strategies could be best effected. With monotonous regularity the Spaniards, always seeking the big victory, sent an army to defeat a rumored gathering of Indians, which rumor was usually broadcast by the Indians themselves. Upon arrival the Spaniards found

17 It should be kept in mind that conquest and settlement were private financial ventures, and very expensive ones. See Governor García Hurtado de Mendoza's complaint in Marmolejo, p. 90.

18 This was Valdivia's experience in Santiago; the Indians tired of "running like beasts" and submitted to reduction (Valdivia to King, Sept. 4, 1545, Gay, I, p. 61).

19 This technique of dissembling was practiced widely, both in Spanish towns and on the frontiers. The Indians were so skilled that the Spanish were never able to tell whether they really meant to keep the peace or not. Either way, there was nothing the Spanish could do but accept, driven as they were by the economic imperative of their way of life. The Indians seem to have understood this perfectly. The granting of terminal peace in critical areas as a part of wider strategy became common. Revolts were well planned: the chiefs had the White women divided among themselves in advance; the gold that had been dug for the Whites during peace was thrown into the nearest river, or used to ransom Indian hostages; bloody revenge was visited upon the erstwhile masters. See Marmolejo, pp. 58-59, 125; Nájera, pp. 46-47, 65.

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themselves outmanned and outmaneuvered, and so were frequently forced to flee for their lives, leaving baggage trains in the hands of the enemy.[20]

It was military planning of this kind that led to the capture and death of Valdivia. Historians generally recognize the death trap into which he fell as the handiwork of Lautaro, the most famous ex-groom in all history. Lautaro has since become one of Chile's great national heroes, symbolizing all that was best in Araucanian culture. Be that as it may, there is considerable reason to believe that Lautaro hailed from the vicinity of Santiago, and was therefore an Araucanian by nothing more than association.[21] His relations with the Araucanians are not clear historically beyond the fact that he led their resistance, aided by other chiefs, until his death in 1557. He was extremely well versed in military strategy, and his deployment of squadrons in place of mass attack and the use of encirclement were valued contributions to Araucanian knowledge, but the fact that many other military techniques were developed after he had passed from the scene would indicate that there were countless Araucanians of equal ability.

Generally speaking, the Araucanians retained their own weapons in the war against the Spanish. Bows and arrows, long lances, spears, long clubs with weighted heads, and slings were the weapons most often used.[22] Strategy was much more

20 For typical accounts see Marmolejo, pp. 35ff., 85, 101, 171-176, 186-187. In the matter of Indian strategy and resistance the Spaniards could not see the forest for the trees. They laid responsibility for their failures on everything but the Indians. A widely prevalent idea, as expressed by Martín Ruiz de Gamboa (Gay, II, p. 123), held that more polished peninsular gentlemen were needed to fight the Indians, ignorant creoles being unfit for the task. Discrimination against creoles was a constant source of dissension in Spanish ranks. In 1557, García Hurtado de Mendoza arrived in Chile as Governor with many peninsulars in his train. The abandon with which he handed out encomiendas to his peninsular friends enraged the luckless creoles. In his reply to their complaints he suggested that no more than a handful of the Chileans knew the identity of their fathers, and then insultingly inquired, *"En qué se andan aquí estos hijos de putas?"* (Marmolejo, p. 80). Nájera (pp. 36-37) took a more realistic view. He stated that creoles were born in war and carried the brunt of the fighting, and did it well. Because the chroniclers ignored their deeds, he added, they were unappreciated in Spain. He considered the disparity between creole and peninsular to be utterly inane.

21 Marmolejo simply states that among those who plotted Valdivia's downfall was a *yanacona* named Alonso, who had been Valdivia's servant (p. 36). This brief notice is the only valid evidence of Lautaro's origin. Among the chroniclers in Chile the term yanacona invariably meant a friendly and allied Indian from the north. Chilean historians are prone to begin with the premise that he was an Araucanian, but have difficulty in explaining how he could have become so *españolado* in the brief period between Valdivia's first contact with the Araucanians and his death. It seems much more likely that Lautaro was taken by Valdivia in Santiago when he was a boy. See Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, *Lautaro* (Santiago, 1876) for the standard nationalistic version.

22 Olaverría, pp. 33-34; Nájera, pp. 95-98. For a plausible account of Araucanian reaction to the Spanish danger after 1550 see Ricardo Latcham, "La capacidad guerrera de los Araucanos: sus armas y métodos militares" (Revista Chilena de Historia y Geografía, vol. 15, no. 19, 1915, pp. 122-193). While this study is valuable for purely military affairs, it does not attempt to

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●725 important than weapons. As noted above, the Indians never fought in a place that was not of their own choosing if they could avoid it. The horse was their greatest problem and one around which their strategy revolved. They chose battle sites wherein the horse would be difficult to manage; they made use of snares on long poles with which to pull the rider from his horse; they dug pitfalls and trenches, placing sharp stakes upon which rider and mount would be impaled; in all of this their chief aim was to get the Spaniard off his mount.[23]

Through the spoils of war and peacetime thievery the Indians acquired a vast supply of horses. By 1594 it was not uncommon for them to put several hundred [492] horsemen in the field. It is to be noted, however, that they used the horse as an auxiliary rather than as an instrument of war. Riding as far as thirty miles a night they raided settlements and ranches under the cover of darkness, leaving death and destruction in their wake.[24] But acquisition of this new mobility did not alter their basic strategy for fighting Spanish forces. Throughout the sixteenth century they continued to lure Spanish troops into carefully prepared ambuscades, themselves remaining on foot. To have done otherwise would have undone their whole strategy. As the Spanish horsemen approached the main Indian force, their lines of retreat were closed by concentric rings of warriors. If the Spanish were fortunate enough to defeat the enemy they found no difficulty in retracing their steps. If, on the other hand, the Indians proved too strong for them, they could retreat only with great difficulty. Once having forced the Spaniards into retreat, the Indians followed them on foot. When the horses tired sufficiently, their riders could be struck down. A Spanish horseman afoot, because of the weight and bulk

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114 explore or interpret the force behind Araucanian military organization beyond the factor of Indian bravery. Another weakness is the author's uncritical use of Pedro Mariño de Lovera's *Crónica del reino de Chile* (CHC, vol. 6). Lovera was another soldier who came to Chile in 1551, served there for a number of years, and then retired to Lima to write a history of Chile. Ostensibly because it was not well written, the manuscript was turned over to a Jesuit, Bartolomé de Escobar for rewriting. As a true courtier, he shifted emphasis to flatter his patron, García Hurtado de Mendoza, and otherwise took liberties which rendered the history worthless. After his revision it was probably revised by Hurtado himself. A copy was subsequently disseminated in Spain by Hurtado in suit for royal reward for services rendered. In like vein, Hurtado was irked at publication of Ercilla's *La Araucana*, which he felt slighted his person. In retaliation he commissioned Pedro de Oña to write his dull *Arauco Domado*, an epic in which Hurtado emerged as the conqueror of Arauco. As Nájera remarked, Oña merely made himself a fool in describing Arauco as subdued when in fact Arauco was more victorious and impregnable than ever before (pp. 36-37). See Diego Barros Arana, *Historia jeneral de Chile* (16 vols., Santiago, 1884-1902, vol. 2, pp. 282-288).

114 23 Marmolejo, pp. 44-49, 85, 62-63. John M. Cooper, "The Araucanians" (*Handbook of South American Indians*, Julian H. Steward, ed., Bulletin, Bureau of American Ethnology, no. 143, vol. 2, p. 697, 1946) is in error when he concludes that the Indians mastered European military tactics and strategy, making them their own.

24 Olaverría, p. 34.

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of his equipment and his inability to dodge through the forest undergrowth, did not have a chance for his life.[25]

The idea of Indians running down horses is not as incredible as it at first seems. In the heat of summer, when most of the fighting took place, the Spanish mounts tired quickly, especially after the long trip to the Indian ambuscade. Besides this, the Araucanians were accustomed to hunting wild game by literally chasing it to death. This required a tireless trot, at which they were proficient. Profiting by the lessons of their own strategy, the Araucanians devised an extremely light saddle in order to increase the endurance of their mounts on long rides. When they used captured Spanish saddles they first cut them down so as to make them considerably lighter.[26]

Shortly after the turn of the century, by 1611 to be exact, the Indians developed a cavalry that in terms of mobility was superior to the Spanish. They likewise possessed the best horses in the whole of Chile. These advantages were demonstrated in more daring raids on Spanish towns and a willingness to meet the Spanish cavalry on its own ground.[27] From this time forward the war passed into a new phase in which Araucanian offensive power became an increasingly significant factor. The source of that power, of course, lay in mastery of the horse. In little more than a generation the animal from which the Indians had once fled in terror had been incorporated into their culture, transforming it into a factor of defiant military power, dedicated to the eradication of Spanish culture. The Spaniards were not only dismayed to recognize this development of Araucanian military strength, but were piqued as well at the sight of barbarous savages riding horses with an air of equality. In answer to Spanish resentment the Indians pledged never to quit their war for freedom and their horses to enter serfdom on foot.[28]

The existence of a skilled and effective military force bespeaks the presence of a comparable political organization under whose genius it is formed and directed. In the development of Araucanian political organization the chronicles indicate two major forces at work: the geographical particularism in which the Araucanians traditionally lived and a counter-force provoked by the presence of the enemy and inclining towards Araucanian unity. Throughout the first century

25 Marmolejo, pp. 40-43, 47-49. These are but representative of many such descriptions.

26 Nájera, pp. 42, 110-116. Cooper (p. 704) gives the impression that Indian saddles and riding gear were nothing more than crude imitations of Spanish models.

27 Nájera, pp. 107-110; "Informe de Juan de Xarquemada," May 1, 1611 (Gay, II, p. 239); Xarquemada to King, Jan. 29, 1611 and Jan. 28, 1612 (*idem*, pp. 247, 255-257); Alonso García Ramón to King, 1613 (*idem*, p. 267).

28 Nájera, p. 116. Whenever the Indians found it necessary or advisable to grant a temporary peace, the Spaniards first insisted that they turn in their horses and move about on foot, as subject persons were expected to do. The Indians invariably turned in their roinsanter, keeping their good stock hidden for use after the next rebellion (*idem*, p. 128).